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Abstract:
We discuss different aims of testing: theory testing, validity testing, simplification testing and
decision making. Different testing methodologies may serve these aims. In particular, the
approaches of Fisher and Neyman-Pearson aze considered. We discuss the meazung of
statistical significance. Significance tests in the Journal of Econometrics are evaluated. The
paper concludes with a challenge to ascertain the impact of statistical testing on economic
thought.
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In a provocative paper, McCloskey (1985, p. 182) contends that `no proposition about
economic behaviour has yet been overturned by econometrics'. McCloskey is not a lonely
skeptic. Many outsiders are doubtful of the value added of econometric testing (e.g. Hahn,
1992). But also many econometricians are increasingly worried about the credibility gap
between econometric theory and applied economics (for example, Spanos, 1986, p. fió0).
Whether the skeptics are right or wrong, we must face the question: What is the significance
of testing econometric hypotheses?
Testing hypotheses belongs to the basic pastimes of econometricians. It is a compulsory topic
in any course in introductory statistics and econometrics. In such a course, students are made
familiar with notions like Type I and Type II errors, significance level, and power. This is
firmly in the tradition of statistical testing along the lines proposed by Jetzy Neyman and
Egon Pearson (1928, 1933). However, econometric practice seems closer to the approach of
Sir R.A. Fisher, although he is rarely mentioned (apart from referettces to the F-test). We
will clarify the differences between both approaches below.
At first sight, the lessons of an introductory econometrics course seem most useful, if one
judges the amount of papers in economic journals that contain statistical tests. A casual
investigation of titles of papers shows that there is a lot of 'testing' in the literature. Less
comforting is the amount of `evidence' that is found. What proportion of the results of tests,
or of the evidence, is regarded to be powerful by a significant part of the audience'? If the
value added of testing is low, some reflections on the merits of testing in econometrics are
due. It must be admitted that it is hard (but perhaps not impossible) to find a convincing
example of a meaningful economic proposition, that has been rejected (or definitively
supported) by econometric tests. Many statistical hypotheses have been tested and rejected.
But in how many cases did the result retnain unchallenged by a respectable colleague, or how
often was a statistical rejection rather than common sense responsible for exorcizing a
' We are grateful to Michael McAleer and Mark Steel for their helpful suggestions.2
defective economic argument? If the value added of testing is low, some reflections on the
merits of testing in econometrics are due.
In Section 2, we discuss aims of testing, relating them to popular views in the philosophy of
science. In Section 3, some statistical methods of testing are discussed. Statistical significance
is analyzed in Section 4, while testing in the Journal of Econometrics is the topic of Section
5. We conclude the paper with a challenge to the readers.
2 Aims of testing
Why test? Sometimes one wonders about the abundance of tests reported in empirical papers,
as the purpose of many of these tests is not always communicated to the reader.
Occasionally, the number of test statistics reported in a paper exceeds the number of
observations used in calculating them! In many cases, the implications of a positive or
negative result are not made clear. If a null hypothesis that apes behave perfectly rationally
is rejected at the 5 Rb significance level, do we care? And should we be interested in the
normality of the residuals, or would it be more useful to put the tests aside and read
Darwin's Origin of Species instead? But perhaps it is inherent to our occupation as
econometricians that we stick to providing statistical inferences.
An important reason for the popularity of testing is that it is often thought to be a major if
not the main ingredient to scientific progress (Popper, 1968; Stigler, 1965, p. 12; Blaug,
1980) and the best way to move from alchemy to science (remember Hendry's three golden
rules of econometrics: test, test and test cf. Hendry, 1980). According to Popper's demar-
cation criterion, scientific hypotheses are falsifiable ones. Unfalsifiable propositions belong
to the domain of inetaphysics, not science. You want to be scientific? Then test your
hypotheses! And one of the fouttders of statistical testing writes `Statistical methods are
essential to social studies, and it is principally by the aid of such methods that these studies3
may be raised to the rank of sciences' (Fisher, 1973a, p. 2).Z Hence, if we wish to be
scientific, then let us test hypotheses--statistical hypotheses, that is.
Occasionally, econometricians reach out to the scientific ideal of testing economic
hypotheses, confronting theory (more precisely, a particular specification of the theory) with
facts. We will call this theory testine. It is the most ambitious of the aims of testing.
Examples are testing monetarism, real business cycle theory, the efficient market hypothesis,
hysteresis, or properties of consumer demand. ldeally, tests in this category deal with efforts
to test one theory against a rival one, that is, to discriminate (monetarism versus
Keynesianism, hysteresis versus heterogeneity). Scientific progress, it is often argued, con-
sists of replacing a defective theory by a better one. Non-nested hypotheses tests,
encompassing tests, but also specification tests and, occasionally, model selection tests,
belong to the category of theory testing.
Theory testing is closely related to a once popular approach in the philosophy of science, the
hypothetico-deductive (HD) method.' This method consists of formulating sets of
hypotheses, from which predictions of novel facts can be deduced: the consequences. These
are the testable implications. The empirical scientist either should try to measttte the degree
of confirmation (according to logical positivists of the Vienna Circle, like Carnap) or try to
falsify these testable implications (according to falsificationists like Popper). Prominent
members of the Cowles Commission, in particular Haavelmo (1944) and Koopmans (1947),
advocated an HD-approach to econometrics which resulted in a formalistic methodology of
economic inference. More recently, HD-econometrics can be found in the writings of new
classical economists, in particular by those who search for 'deep' (structural) parameters.
Another recent publication in the tradition of the HD-approach is Stigttm (1990). But
Summers (1990) forcefully argues that fotmalistic empirical econometrics has not yielded
Z Ironically, the quote continuous as follows: `This particulaz dependence of social
studies upon statistical methods has led to the unfortunate misapprehension that statistics is
to be regarded as a branch of economics, whereas in truth methods adequate to the treatment
of economic data, in so far as they exist, have mostly been developed in the study ofbiology
and the other sciences.'
' See Chapter 3 in Eatman (1992) for discussion and references.4
interesting insights in macrceconomics: this approach to inference leads merely to a
`scientific illusion'.
Popper's falsificationism has had a strong impact on the minds of economists. Popper is
about the only philosopher of scienee occasionally quoted in Econometrica. In the philosophy
of science literature, however, falsificationism has become increasingly unpopular. Not in
the least because actual science rarely follows the Popperian maxims. As Hacking (1983, p.
15) notes, `accepting and rejecting is a rather minor part of science' (see also the
contributions in Earman, 1983, and those in De Marchi, 1988). T'heory testing is an aim that,
in practice, is less important than some would like to think.
An alternative to hypothetico-deductivism is Bayesian inductive inference. Carnap (1952) also
contributed to this approach, but Jeffreys (1961) had a stronger impact on the Bayesian
minority in econometrics.' This alternative approach shares with the HD-method a belief in
growth of knowledge (a feature that has been attacked by so-called post-modernist
philosophy; see Mirowski, 1994). However, the aim of theory testing is less important in the
Bayesian inductive tradition than within Popperian hypothetico-deductivism (see e.g. Leamer,
1978, p. 9). Some Bayesians do not see merit in hypothesis testing, they hold measurement
as the more interesting aim of inference. If rival hypotheses exist, and e.g. prediction is the
purpose of inference, the best one can do is to weigh the alternative hypotheses and use a
basket of weighed predictions. Other Bayesians use Jeffreys' Posterior Odds Ratios as a test
statistic. If decision making is the purpose of the test, then the behaviouristic approach of
Savage (1972) is advocated by some Bayesians (below, we will discuss decision making as
a distinct aim of testing).
If theory-testing is an interesting aim at all, it is not yet clear that econometrics is the best
tool for this purpose. Identifying informative historical episodes (see e.g. Summers, 1991)
or devising laboratory experiments (increasingly popular among game theorists, who rarely
supplement their experiments with statistical analysis, as casual reading of such experimental
' See Howson and Urbach (1989) and Earman (1992) for philosophical backgrounds of
Bayesian confirmation theory.5
reports in Econometrica reveals) may generate more effective tests than many Uniformly
Most Powerful (UMP) tests. Consider Science with capital S: physics. Here, sophisticated
statistical considerations play a minor role in appraising theories. Giere ( 1988, p. 190)
discusses the different attitudes towards data appraisal in nuclear physics and the social scien-
ces. Nuclear physicists tend to judge the fit between empirical and theoretical models
primarily on yualitative arguments. Test statistics such as X' are rarely reported in nuclear
physics papers contained in e.g. the Physical Review.s Theory (or hypothesis) testing dces
not necessarily depend upon the tools we learned in our statistics courses.
We will now turn to other aims of testing, less prominent in philosophical writings, but
dominant in practical research. Most tests are not as ambitious as the theory tests discussed
above. An important case is the class of the (statisticall validity tests (mis-specification tests
or diagnostic checks). Validity tests are performed in order to find out whether the statistical
assumptions underlying some model are credible. Spanos (1994) is an ezample of extensive
validity testing. He follows the argument that in order to pursue a theory test, one first has
to be sure of the validity of the statistical assumptions that are made. According to this view,
validity testing is a prerequisite to theory testing (note that Granger et al. , 1994, advocate
the reverse ordering). If theory testing is not the ultimate aim, validity testing still may be
important. Much empirical work aims to show that a particular model (fotmally or informally
related to some theory) is able to represent the data. If much information in the data remains
unexploited (for example, revealed by non-white-noise residuals), this representation will be
suspect or unconvincing to a large part of the audience.
Sometimes, however, it is argued that the merits of validity tests should not be over-
emphasized. One may obtain a very neat `valid' statístical model of some economíc
phenomenon, after extensive torturing of the data. Such a specification suggests much more
precise knowledge than the data actually contain. Sensitivity analysis, either along the lines
of Lxamer (1978) or Friedman (see for example the discussion in Summers, 1991), is at least
as important as validity testing in order to make credible inferences. Illuminating in this
context is the exchange between Hendry and Ericsson (1991) and Friedman attd Schwartz
5 Baird (1988) makes a similar observation.6
(1991).
A third important aim of testing is simplification testinQ. Simple models that do not perform
notably worse than more complex ones are typically preferred to the complex ones. Inference
conditional on exogeneity assumptions is often preferced to full information estimation. Still,
it is regularly argued that, apart from convenience, there are no clear formal reasons why
simple models deserve special credit (but see Keuzenkamp and McAleer, 1994, for discussion
and further references). A popular view on simplification testing is that the researcher should
start with a very general model, and perform a downward test strategy in which
uninformative elements of a model are deleted (Hendry and Ericsson, 1991). In practice,
many researchers feel that simplicity matters, but rather than testing from general to simple,
they perform iterative símplification searches.
Finally, a frequently expressed goal of testing is decision makine (e.g. Granger et al. , 1994).
This view on testing, and its implementation to statistics, is primarily due to the Neyman-
Pearson theory of inductive behaviour (Neyman and Pearson, 1928, 1933). The decision-
theoretic approach to testing has been further elaborated by Wald and, from a Bayesian
perspective, by Savage (1972). Lehmann (1986) is the authorative reference for the
frequentist approach, while Berger (1985) provides the Bayesian arguments.
Decision making, based on statistical acceptance rules, can be important for process quality
control, but may even be extended to the appraisal of theories. This brings us back to theory
testing. Lakatos, the neo-Popperian philosopher, claims that the Neyman-Pearson version of
theory testing 'rests completely on methodological falsificationism' (Lakatos, 1978, p. 25n).
Apart from the fact that this reverts historical priority (the first German edition of Popper
(1968) appeared in 1934), it is also at odds with Popper's own rejection of behaviourism (see
Keuzenkamp, 1994, Chapter 3.4.4, for further discussion). Still, it may be argued that the
Neyman-Pearson approach to theory testing (popularized in econometrics by Haavelmo,
1944) fits in the broader hypothetico-deductive approach, of which Popper's version is only7
one brand.`'
At this point, one of the most bitter disputes in science deserves special mention: the Fisher
versus Neyman-Pearson controversy. One of the sources of their dispute was the aim of
testing. While Neyman-Pearson acceptance rules can be placed in the hypothetico-deduc[ive
camp, the views uf Fisher are closer to a Bayesian inductive appruach.' Fisher's theory uf
estimatiun and testing is a theory of learning, meant for inductive inference from small
samples. Neyman and Pearson opposed aiming at inductive inference. They interpret tests
along behaviouristic lines, as acceptance tvles in the context of repeated sampling. At best,
Fisher was willing to support such an interpretation for problems in commerce or technology,
but not for appraising scientific hypotheses. The reason is that in such cases, repeated
sampling is a misleading fiction, and there is no well defined decision problem. Many
advances made in science do not serve a well specified purpose, moreover, `they may be put
sooner or later to the service of a number of purposes, of which we can know nothing'
(Fisher 1973b, pp. 106-7). Even if there would be a well specified decision problem,
estimation was of more interest to Fisher than devising UMP tests.e Indeed, for many
econometric papers that appear in the Journal of Econometrics and Econometrica among
others, it is hard to define the decision problem and loss functions that should figure in the
background if a Neyman-Pearson approach were followed.
Such doubts are shared by Savage (1972, p. 254) who wri[es that, although having [ested
many sharp null hypotheses, he is unable to give a satisfactory analysis of testing such hypu-
theses. To him, the role of extreme null hypotheses in science is `obscure'. A problem with
such hypotheses is that in many cases the loss associated with the alternative is zero, only
6 Giere (1983) is a philosopher's view on theory testing, which is an augmented version
of the Neyman-Pearson theory (without mentioning Neyman-Pearson).
' Although Fisher rejected Bayesianism in cases where there is no infotmative prior
probability, he had an alternative: so-called fiducial inference (see Fisher, 1973b). This has
been characterized as 'a bold attempi to make the Bayesian omelette without breaking the
Bayesian eggs' (Savage, 1961, p. 578).
g For Fisher's views on the Neyman-Pearson methodology, see Fisher (1973b, pp. 42,
80, 103-107), and Section 3 below.8
a loss (or gain) exists if the null is exactly satisfied. The behaviouristic theory of inference
is difficult t~~ apply in such circumstances. Still, many ecunometricians do test sharp null
hypotheses, and think that these tests are straightforward applications of testing in the Ney-
man-Pearson tradition.
Many such sharp null hypotheses are of little scientific interest anyway. Still, even the best
journals, such as the Journal of Econometrics, report tests of purchasing power parity or
perfectly efficient markets, even if we are all aware that these theories are not literary true.
Would it noi be more interesting, in such cases, [o measure how close the real world is to
the ideal world of the theories? According to Leamer (1978, p. 9), hypothesis testing
searches are rare, while Jeffreys (1961, p. 389) remarks that `what are called significance
tests in agricultural experiments seem to me to be very lazgely problems of pure estimation.'
Jeffreys' argument, if applied to economics, would run like this. A labour economist has a
very good idea of what to expect when estimating a model that analyus the returns to
schooling. His problem is to choose the variables, and obtain a sample of sufficient size, such
that the effect of education and other variables of interest become detectable. It is the
magnitude of the effects that is of primary interest. Any level of significance can be obtained
by making the sample size large enough, unless the null hypothesis is exactly true (Berkson,
1938).
This concludes our discussion of four distinct aims of testing: theory testing, validity testing,
simplification testing and testing for making decisions. We now turn to a number of statistical
methods that serve these aims of testing.
3 Methods of statistical testing
Informal statistical testing of hypotheses has a long history (frequently cited examples of
significance testing avant la lettre are Arbuthnot on male vs. female births in 1710, Mitchell
on the distribution of stars in 1767, and Laplace in 1812; see e.g. Hacking, 1975, p. 168;
Baird, 1988). In 1885, Edgeworth introduced the term `significant' in statistics (Baird, 1988).9
The modern approach to significance testing starts with Karl Pearson's goodness of fit test
for large samples (Pearson, 1900). The basic philosophy of his testing procedures is as
foilows. A sample is used to estimate a test parameter of interest. The distribution under the
null is known, and if the estimate falls too far into the tail of the distribution, one of the
following conclusions must be drawn: either something very uncommon has happened, or the
null hypothesis is wrong. The P-value (tail area integral) thus obtained is compared with a
benchmark, like 0.01 or 0.05 (see Section 4, below). Subsequently, in statistical inference,
the option that the null is wrong is chosen if the P-value falls beyond the benchmark level.
Henry L. Moore belonged to the first economists who applied Pearson's methods to
economics (see also Stigler, 1965). W.S. Gosset, better known by his pseudonym Student,
introduced [he small sample t-test for the equality of ineans in 1908. Bu[ Fisher greatly
extended the scope of testing, he also derived the correct degrees of freedom that belong to
different applications of the tests.9 Fisher also invented analysis of variance and the F-test
(originally labelled as Z-[est). "' His method of maximum likelihood remains widely used,
but his reliance on the likelihood principle and conditional inference is not generally
accepted." In his doctoral thesis, Koopmans (1937) built on Fisher's methods of estimation
and testing. It is notable that Tinbergen (1939), who supervised Koopmans' thesis, dces not
make use of significance testing. Instead, Tinbergen's approach is better characterized as
importance testing. (Jeffreys would probably argue that this again is a problem ofestimation,
rather than testing.)
To sum up the Fisherian theory of significance testing, it contains the following
characteristics:
i) reliance on tail areas (P-values);
9 In 1922, Gosset sent his tables of the t-test to Fisher, writing 'you are the only man
that's ever likely to use them!' See Joan Fisher Box (1978, pp. 116, 451).
"' z is a transformation of F which was easier to interpolate (Z - ll2 1ttF).
" Lehmann (1993) discusses the issue of conditional inference and compares Fisher's
perspective with tha[ of Neyman.10
ii) intended for small samples;
iii) instruments for inductive scientific inference.
This approach has received two kinds of criticism. The first comes from Jeffreys, who rejects
i). The second criticism is given by Neyman and Egon Pearson (the son of Karl Pearson),
who argue that i) alone is not sufficient to select a test procedure; ii) should be replaced by
repeated sampling; and who also disagree with iii). To start with Jeffreys (1961, p. 385), he
argues that any particular set of observations has a low probability to obtain, hence, 'If inere
improbability of the observations, given the hypothesis, was the criterion, any hypothesis
whatever would be rejected.' In the posterior odds approach, advocated by Jeffreys, this
problem vanishes since the ratio of probability values for two distinct hypotheses will be
informative; the small factors cancel. The P-integral methodology instead dces not appraise
the probability of the actual observations, in view of a hypothesis, but takes the observations
that would generate P-values beyond the benchmark IeveL `The latter gives the probability
of departures, measured in a particular way, equal to orgreater than the observed set, and
the contribution from the actual value is nearly always negligible. What the use ofPimplies,
therefore, is that a hypothesis that may be true may be rejected because it has not predicted
observable resu[ts that have not occurred. This seems a remarkable procedure.' (Jeffreys,
1961, p. 385, his italics). In other words, this method of inference violates the likelihood
principle. Another criticism of Jeffreys (1961, p. 390) is that it is not very useful to reject
a hypothesis without having some idea of what to put in its place (see also Keuzenkamp and
Barten, 1994).
We already noted that the test approach advanced in Neyman and Pearson (1928) and further
explored in their later writings (in particular, Neyman and Pearson, 1933) diverges from
Fisher's in some important respects (but note that Neyman and Pearson adopted many of
Fisher's insights, and at first were even convinced that their work was just an improvemen[
of Fisher's; see Fisher Box, 1978, for details, and Reid, 1982, for a perspective that sides
with Neyman and Pearson).
First, there is a philosophical distinction between Neyman-Pearson methods and Fisherian
hypothesis testing. The Neyman-Pearson approach is not based on inductive aspirations (such11
as Fisher's), but is directed to behaviour, following the then fashionable behaviouristic school
of thought in psychology and other disciplínes (J.B. Watson's classic on behaviourism
appeared in 1930, and papers on that topic have appeared since 1913). The Neyman-Pearson
tests are acceptance procedures, decision rules (see above), no[ me[hods of inference.
Secondly, Neyman and Pearson were dissatisfied with the existence of a wide range of tests
while no one knew which one was the 'best'. According to Fisher, the research worker
normally knows what alternatives are relevant (withou[ specifying them) and, therefore, what
test is to be selected. However, Neyman and Pearson tried to define general optimaliry
conditions for tests, in a context of repeated sampling. 1'his can only be done after the un-
specified alternative hypotheses in the Fisher-approach are replaced by specific alternatives.
Once this step is made, the notion of errors of the first kind (rejecting a correct null
hypothesis) and the second kind (accepting a false null hypothesis) can be introduced, the
power of a test is defined, and UMP tests can be obtained in a number of cases. The
likelihood ratio (LR) test (first proposed on intuitive grounds in 1928, then justified on
theoretical grounds in 1933), stands out as their principal contribution to the theory of
hypotheses testing.
Summarizing, to contras[ the Neyman-Pearson approach to Fisher's, the following points
characterize the Neyman-Pearson methodology:
i) emphasis on size and power, leading to UMP tests;
ii) applications to contexts of repeated sampling;
iii) instruments for inductive behaviour and making decisions.
At the formal level Neyman and Pearson seem to have won the battle with Fisher. Many
economists have learnt Neyman-Pearson methods of hypothesis testing in their first
introductory course in statistics. For example, the treatment of hypothesis testing in the
popular statistics textbook of Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1985) is based on a simplified
version of Neyman-Pearson testing (an explicit reference to Neyman-Pearson is given on p.12
2S7).'Z Another popular textbook used in econometrics is Judge et al. (1988). Hypothesis
[esting is intcrpreted as a decision problem in the light of the costs of making an incorrect
decision (p. 93), the discussion is entirely in the spirit of Neyman-Pearson procedures. The
encyclopaedic nature of [his lx~ok is retlected in alternative discussions of hypothesis testing,
in particular posterior odds (p. 131), but Fisher's approach is not discussed. Goldberger's
(1991) textbook deals with hypo[hesis testing from a Neyman-Pearson perspective (Chapter
20) and even explains the Neyman-Pearson implication of a rejection of a null at a 5 qo
significance level: `Loosely speaking, when the null is true, in S~ of the samples drawn
from the population, the decision will be"reject the null"' (Goldberger, 1991, p. 21S).
Finally, the survey paper of Engle (1984) gives an overview of test procedures (Lagrange
Multiplier tests, starting at the null and testing whether movements to the altetnative lead to
an improvement; Wald tests, starting at the alternative; and LR tests that may proceed
symmetrically), all based on Neyman-Pearson principles.
The implementation of Neyman-Pearson methods at the practical level is not easy, though.
There is a wide divergence between empirical econometrics and the maxims of a`celibate
priesthood of statistical theorists', as Leamer (1978, p. vi) observes. One reason for the
dominance of the Neyman-Pearson approach among this priesthood might be that it lends
itself to mathematical recreation. Another non-substantive reason is the attraction that the
words `best' and `powerful' exert. But it is more interesting to evaluate the substantive
features of Neyman-Pearson testing. They have several drawbacks.
First, consider the notion of power. According to Fisher, emphasis on power is in many
cases hardly relevant. To a practical researcher, `it is, of course, a matter of indifference
with what probability he might be led to accept the hypothesis falsely, for in his case he is
not accepting it' (Fisher, 1973b, p. 42). Another problem with the power of a test is that it
may be low when the model is mis-specified (i.e. the maintained hypothesis is wrong). On
the other hand, some tests (such as the Durbin-Watson test) happen to be rather powerful
against mis-specifications for which they are not intended. The Neyman-Pearson approach
'Z In a subtle deviation from the Neyman-Pearson interpretation of testing, Wonnacott and
Wonnacott (1985, p. 2S9) argue that a statistical test is a device to judge the acceptability or
plausibility of the hypothesis.13
hinges on the `axiom of correct specification' (Leamer, 1978, p. 4). Recently, efforts have
been made to extend the scope of Neyman-Pearson methods to mis-specified models (an
example is Vuong, 1989). An aliernative, becoming increasingly popular, is to use non-
parametric methods of inference. Some investigators who support this approach believe that
they can avoid making the specificatíon ercors that afflict pazametric inference (see also
Hárdle and Kirman, 1994).
Secondly, the fiction of repeated sampling is questionable. One of the first critics was Fisher.
He states that 'if we possess a unique sample in Student's sense on which significance tests
are to be performed, there is always, as Venn ( 1876) ín particular has shown, a multipliciry
of populations to each of which we can legitimately regard our sample as belonging: so that
the phrase " repeated sampling from the same population" dces not enable us to determine
which population is to be used to define the probability level, for no one of them has
objective reality, all being products of the statistician's imagination.' (Fisher, 1955, p.
71)."
Thirdly, although some argue that the decision-theoretical approach should be natural to
economists, in many cases it is very difficult to determine what decision really inspires a
particular test, and what loss is involved (see Section 2 above). Although the decision-
theoretical approach to theory testing is obscure, it may be helpful in cases of validity
testing, which has some resemblance to process quality control (if we are willing to ignore
the Neyman-Pearson emphasis on repeated sampling). The loss, e.g. involved with serial
correlation, might be that readers who stick to the Sqo convention will stop reading a
research report if they suspect that serial correlation is not properly taken care of. It still is
not a fotmal loss, expressed in dollars, but loss resulting from loss of readership driven by
(bad or good) conventions (see the blunt comments in Friedman, 1988, footnote 11).
Although such a justification of Neyman-Pearson methods for validity testing could be
sustained, one of the proponents of Neyman-Pearson methods makes a distinction between
`model design criteria (exhausting the available data evidence) and genuine tests in the
Neyman-Pearson sense (based on previously unavailable evidence)' (Hendry, 1992, p. 366).
" The reference to Venn relates to the second edition of The Logic of Chance.14
He adds that `only information that arrived after a model is in the public domain can be
deemed an adequate basis for a test' (Hendry 1992, p. 374). If we unders[and Hendry
correctly, he argues that validity testing (model design) is not genuinely Neyman-Pearson,
but theory testing is a kind of Neyman-Pearson quality control test. We agree with the firs[
statement, as genuine Neyman-Pearson testing requires repeated sampling. For the same
reason, the second statemen[ seems less convincing (the accumulation of a handful of extra
quarterly observatíons can hardly count as an ins[ance of repeated sampling). Moreover, it
is not clear how to interpret scientific inference as a genuine decision problem, to be solved
with behaviouristic arguments.
A fourth problem with Neyman-Pearson testing is that, if we have two explicitly specified
aliernatives to choose from, it is more natural to choose [he one with the higher likelihood
without considering the power functions and without having to take one as the null and the
other as the alternative (see ]effreys, 1961, p. 396; a Bayesian would consider the posterior
odds ratio.) Vuong (1989) discusses how the LR test can be used in a symmetric way for
model selection and testing non-nested hypotheses in a context of independent observations.
A general problem of significance testing, whether Neyman-Pearson or Fisherian, occurs
when multiple tests are carried out. Depending on how dependent these tests are, the overall
significance level may be much higher than the individual significance levels. The problem
was recognized by the early econometricians. Indeed, Haavelmo (1944, p. 83) already
discusses, in today's parlance, pre-testing. It is valid, he argues, but not if the set of a priori
admissible hypotheses is `a function of the sample point'. This rules out to experiment with
the maintained hypothesis. Naive induction, as one might call this method, cannot be totally
ignored (to use an understatement) if one appraises empirical econometrics. Moreover, not
only the maintained hypothesis may be the result of `data mining', but not infrequently the
altetnative hypothesis is inspired by a rejection of a null rather than specified in advance, as
it should in case of the Neyman-Pearson methods. The problem of interpreting the resulting
test statistics remains unsolved today (see Godfrey 1988, p. 3; Leamer, 1978, p. 5). Indeed,
as Hendry (1992, p. 369) notes, test sta[istics can frequen[ly be made insignificant by
consttuction, since the residuals are not autonomous but derived processes.ls
Many authors agree that significance tests are not the only or ultimate tests of economic
hypotheses. Friedman is not alone in his verdict that `the real test of a theory' lies in its
predictive ability, a theme he has consistendy repeated since his 1940 review of Tinbergen's
(1939) statistical tests of business cycle theories. This ability may be evaluated quantitatively,
with statistical tools, but also qualitatively. Theil (1971, p. 545) argues that statistical
procedures are not sacrosanct in modelling. `The real test is provided by prediction based on
an independent set of data. It is not at all self-evident that selections that are exclusively
based on the smallest residual-variance estimates lead to the best predictions.' Similar
opinions are expressed by Hendry (1992, p. 374), Zellner (1988, p. 31) and numerous other
econometricians.
4. What is `signif;cant'?
If economists have natural constants, then their values are 0.01 and 0.05. From early
applications to the most recent hypothesis tests, investigators have relied on a significance
level of 0.01 or 0.05. This convention owes much to Fisher's tabulation of statistical
distributions in Fisher (1973a), first published in 1925." Fisher and Gosset (`Student')
cooperated in calculating tables for the t-distribution. Fisher also tabulated the distributions
of X' and the z-transformation of the F-distribution. Originally, Fisher hoped to include
existing tables of X', made by W.P. Elderton and published in Biometrika of 1902, in his
book. However, Karl Pearson (editor of Biometrika, father of Egon Pearson) did not allow
him to reprint those tables. Pearson did not approve of Fisher's refinements of interpreting
the x' test (in particular, the issue of degrees of freedom), and their personal relations were
bad [see M.G. Kendall (1963) and Fisher Box (1978)]. Hence, Fisher was forced to make
a distinct table by himself. He decided to turn the tables inside out, which seemed more
convenient as well. Existing tables provided P-values (tail areas) for given values of X' and
t. Fisher argues that `Instead of giving the values of P corresponding to an arbitrary series
" We are grateful to Jim Durbin for historical advice on this ma[ter. See also Hall and
Selinger (1986) for a discussion of the historical roots of the 5~ convention.16
of values of X', we have given the values of X' corresponding to specially selected values of
P' (Fisher, 1973a, p. 79; see Fisher Box, 1978, pp. 246-7 for further background). The P-
values for which the X' distribution was tabulated (for n-1...30) are .99, .98, .90, .80, .70,
.50, .30, .20, .10, .05, .02 and .O1 (Fisher, 1973a, pp. 112-113). A similarly extensive
tabulation is provided for the t-distribution (op. cit. p. 176). Hence, the .OS significance levei
is not singled out as one with special merit, although Fisher (1973a, pp. 114-5) writes that
`If the difference is many times greater than the standard error, it is certainly significant, and
it is a convenient convention to take twice the standard error as the limit of significance; this
is roughly equivalent to the corresponding limit P-.05 already used for the X' distribution.'
Finally, as the z(or F-) distribution needs separate tables for all significance levels, Fisher
decided to tabulate this distribution for `three especially important values ofP' (Fisher 1973a,
p. 228, pp. 244-9): .05, .Ol and .001. Those are the significance levels that we observe as
the few natural constants that economists rely on when they do empirical research. Still,
Fisher (1973b, p. 42) warns against dogmatically applying a fixed level of significance in all
circumstances.
Although Fisher was not the first statistician who tested at a Sq-significance-level, he
facilitated its breakthrough by suggesting to use 'significant' as an abbreviation of `significant
at the Sqo-level' and moreover by means of his convenient tabulation. His interest in small
sample analysis is reflected by the fact that his tables run from n-1 to n-30 (and in some
cases also include 60 and infinity). Fisher dces not discuss what the appropriate significance
levels are for large samples. Berkson (1938) observed that, as sample size grows to infinity,
any sharp null hypothesis is likely to be rejected at a fixed significance level. This has
yielded the suggestion to vary the significance level with sample size (Leamer, 1978). As we
will see in the next section, this suggestion has been largely ignored in practice. A possible
explanation is [hat statisticians try to measure parameters using some benchmark level of
precision. A fixed significance level serves this purpose. Ifour conjecture is valid, we expect
to find that models estimated with many observations to have a higher dimensional parameter
vector (we did not attempt to test this hypothesis statistically).
Given the conventional significance levels, it remains to explain what they really mean. Most17
textbooks ignore this issue, but there are notable exceptions. Wonnacott and Wonnacott
(1985) prefer the expression ' statistically discernible at the Sq error level' to the more
familiar phraseology `sta[istically significant at the Sq significance level'. An explicit
waming is given that statis[ical significance is not the same as impottance (or substance, in
Goldberger, 1991, p. 240). Furthermore, [he discussion of the X' test points to some
limitations of hypotheses tests (Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1985, pp. 488-9), in particular
to the fact that such tests often give answers to the wrong question. Goldberger's ( 1991, p.
215) explanation of the meaning of rejection at a 5~-significance-level, quoted in Section 2
above, is the valid interpretation of Neyman-Pearson testing. But how often is the question
that an econometrician has to answer a decision problem in the context of repeated sampling?
Fisher's interpretation of a small P-value (which follows the tradition of Laplace to K.
Pearson), that either something very unlikely has happened, or the null is false, may be more
useful in econometric practice. A third altetnative is to intetpret P-values as odds factors. In
this case, however, the Bayesian (posterior odds) perspective may be preferred, as Jeffreys
already showed that posterior odds ratios often tell a different story than significance tests
based on a fixed significance level (Jeffreys, 1961; Berger, 1985).
A different perspective on interpreting significance tests arises when one realizes that, at Ieast
in economics, most inferences are based on extensive data-mining. Karl Pearson objected to
using arbitrary levels of significance to assess the valídity of a hypothesis. Instead, statistics
involves curve fitting and gradual approximation from poor fit to good fit, not from falsity
to truth. Goodness of fit tests 'are used to ascertain whether a reasonable graduation curve
has been achieved, and not to assert whether one or another hypothesis is true or false' (K.
Pearson, letter to Nature, 1935, cited in Hall and Selinger, 1986, p. 359). This skeptical
view on significance testing is not much heard today, Milton Friedman being one of the
exceptions (see e.g. Friedman, 1988, p. 323, footnote 11).
5 Testing in the Journal of Econometrics
The strong emphasis in joumals on significance testing not only exists in economics. The18
JRSS (Journal of the Royal Statistical Society) is sometimes referred to as the JSSR (Journal
of Statistically Significant Results).15 Similarly, the economic literature abounds with
significance tests. Zellner (1979) contains a small survey of 22 quantitative articles in five
issues of different leading economic journals in 1978. He finds that significance testing is
very popular, that loJo and SoJo significance levels domina[e, and power considerations are
rarely discussed, despite the dominance of Neyman-Pearson methods in the training of
economists. According to another survey, of Canterbery and Burkhardt (1983, p. 31), out
of 542 empirical papers that appeared in the American Economic Review, Journal ofPolitical
Economy, Economic Journaland Quanerly JournalofEconomics from 1973-1978, only three
articles attempted to refute the hypothesis under investigation. Although this may sound
unnerving, there is a reason why econometricians do not play the falsificationist game with
much enthusiasm. In most cases, rejection of economic hypotheses is easy, whereas
verification is hard (anyone with experience in economic modelling knows how difficult it
can be to obtain models that are `satisfactory').
For the purpose of investigating [he significance of significance tests, we surveyed the papers
in the Journal of Econometrics (excluding Annals), Volumes 1-46 (1973-1990). In total, 668
papers were counted. Of those papers, 17qo have `test' (or `testing') in the titie. Not all 668
papers contain data. 2óqo contain artificial data, used for Monte Carlo investigations. Of the
papers containing empirical data, many use those data for the purpose of illustration only
(this is obviously the case if, for example, 'Klein I' is estimated--one of the most popular
models in this Journal). We excluded those papers from our analysis (in a few cases, the
choice is somewhat arbitrary).
This left 137 papers (21 q) with an empirical message that exceeds mere illustration. Among





15 See Wonnacott and Wonnacott ( 1986, p. 573), who also discuss the `editor's bias' of




The choice of the significance level might depend on sample size, in view of Berkson's
(1938) observation and similar recommendations of Jeffreys (1961, p. 435) and L.eamer
(1978, p. 105). Hence, we investigated the relation between significance level and sample
size." Indeed, a few explicit references can be found concerning sample size and the trade-
off between 'expected loss from Type I and Type II errors', as in a paper in Vol. 22 where
a sample of 728 observations inspires a 1 qo significance level. In a paper in Vol. 44, a null
hypo[hesis is rejected at a 5 qo significance level which the author had rather preferred to
accept. Given sample size (14,487 observations), the author argues that conventional
significance levels are not appropriate. Instead, with such large samples, `a case can be made
for using a Bayesian procedure'. However, upon further analysis of the relation between
significance Ievel and sample size in empirical papers, it appears that the correlation between
sample size and significance level is opposite to what might be expected. The correlation
coefficient is posi[ive and has a value of .20! Hence, in practice, the choice of significance
levels seems arbitrary and depends more on convention and, occasionally, on the desire of
an investigator to reject or accept a hypothesis rather than on a well defined evaluation of
conceivable losses that might result from incorrect decisions.
The papers which explicitly attempt to test a theory statistically are rare Qess [han a dozen);
the cases where a clear conclusion (acceptance or rejection of the theory) emerges, are even
rarer. In cases where a decisive conclusion is obtained, the same volume may contain a test
of the same hypothesis with the opposite result (e.g. tests of efficient markets in Vol. 4). If
a theory is rejected (e.g. neoclassical production theory, Vol. 7, or the theory of demand,
Vol. 15, both at a 1 qo-significance level), it often remains unclear what the implications are
'" A number of papers refers to more than one significance leveL In that case, the most
stringent (lowest) level is reported. Where this could be verified, it turned out that papers
where the significance level remains implicit (`the parame[er is significant') all refec to the
5 qo-significance-level. Hence, in those cases where this could not be verified, we assume that
the Sqo level is applied as well. Papers which report P-values are not included in this count.
" As it is not our purpose to blame specific authors, we refer in the following only to
volume numbers and not to specific papers.20
(thc 'nc~l vcry cuntinuclivr amclusion' ix 'worth rcmcmtkring', ur 'rcjcclion ut Ihc lhcory
is not necessarily implied'). Occasionally, it is acknowledged that the implication of
significance tests is often unclear: a rejection dces not necessarily mean a rejection of the
hypothesis of interest, as auxiliary hypotheses might be false instead (see also Keuzenkamp
and Barten, 1994).
In analyzing significance tests published in the Journal ofEconometrics, we were surprised
that some elementary rules are occasionally violated. Sample sizes are not always reported.
Investigators claim to test a hypothesis at an unspecified or a 95~ significance level, when
a Solo level is meant. The advice by Goldberger (1991, p. 217), to use correct wording, is
appropriate not onty to undergraduate students.
6 Theory testing and signiticance: a challenge
According to Engle (1984, p. 776), `If the confrontation of economic theories with
observable phenomena is the objective of empirical research, then hypothesis testing is the
primary tool of analysis.' This is the view of a mainstream econometric theorist. This view
puts high emphasis on testing, but many econometricians are aware of the limited impact of
testing and concur in McCloskey's skepticism. Spanos (1986, p. 660) acknowledges that `to
my knowledge, no economic theory was ever abandoned because it was rejected by some
empirical econometric test, nor was a clear-cut decision between competing theories made
in lieu of the evidence of such a test.' The same verdict has been expressed by economic
theorists like Hahn (1992): 'I know of no economic theory which all reasonable people would
agree to have been falsified.' Not only theorists argue like this. Summers ( 1991, p. 133)
writes that `It is difficult to think today of many empirical studies from more than a decade
ago whose bottom line was a parameter estimate or the acceptance or rejection of a
hypothesis.' In many cases, formal econometric hypothesis testing is unpersuasive. The valuezl
added of econometric tests may be less than desired. Some even argue that we only test what
we already believe beforehand. According to Keynes ( 1921), `The truth is that sensible
investigators only employ the correlation ccefficient to test or confirm conclusions at which
they have arrived on other grounds. But that dces not validate the crude way in which the
argument is sometimes presented. or preven[s it from misleading the unwary-since not all
investigators are sensible.'
These skeptical observations on significance testing for the purpose of theory testing should
challenge econometricians who think otherwise. Therefore, we invite readers to name a paper
that contains significance tests which significantly changed the way you think about some
economic proposition. The following rules of the game apply:
1. You may inteipret the notion `significance test' broadly, i.e. both Fisher's and
Neyman-Pearson's interpretations are accepted (please indicate if one of those
interpretations is most appropriate).
2. Give exact reference to author, paper, journal etc., and to the particular test(s) you
think persuaded economists.
3. Summarize the test result by:
a) what is the hypothesis tested;
b) is the hypothesis accepted or rejected;
c) if the hypothesis is rejected, is there a constructive message?
4. If possible, provide auxiliary evidence that the particular test has been persuasive to
others.
"Che responses to this challenge will be processed statistically and if the results are of
sufficient interest, they will be reported. Your may send us your suggestion until six months
after publication of this Issue. The most convincing contribution will be awarded with an
invitation for a one week visit to CentER (expenses paid).22
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